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# 03 Basic Cryptography

William M. Farmer

Department of Computing and Software  
McMaster University

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# What is Cryptography?

- **Definition 1:** **Cryptography** is the art and science of concealing meaning (Bishop).
- **Definition 2:** **Cryptography** is a collection of mathematical techniques for:
  - ▶ Protecting data confidentiality.
  - ▶ Protecting data integrity.
  - ▶ Verifying the identity of objects.
  - ▶ Verifying the identity of subjects.
  - ▶ Producing random objects.

# Principal Cryptographic Techniques

- Conventional encryption.
- Cryptographic hashing.
- One-way encryption.
- Public key encryption.
- Random number generation.

# Conventional Encryption

- A single **key** is required that is kept secret.
- **Encryption**: plaintext, key  $\xrightarrow{f}$  ciphertext.
- **Decryption**: ciphertext, key  $\xrightarrow{f^{-1}}$  plaintext.
- $f$  and  $f^{-1}$  are the encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively.
- **Main assumption**: Computation of the plaintext from the ciphertext is mathematically infeasible without the key.
- In practice, the security of the process depends primarily on **maintaining the secrecy of the key!**

# Cryptosystems

- A **cryptosystem** is a tuple  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$  where:
  - ▶  $\mathcal{P}$  is a set of **plaintexts**.
  - ▶  $\mathcal{C}$  is a set of **ciphertexts**.
  - ▶  $\mathcal{K}$  is a set of **keys**.
  - ▶  $\mathcal{E}$  is a set of **encryption functions**  $f : \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$ .
  - ▶  $\mathcal{D}$  is a set of **decryption functions**  $f^{-1} : \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$ .
- **Example:** System of Caesar ciphers.

# Ciphers

- A **cipher** is an encryption/decryption method.
- Mono-alphabetic ciphers (letter-for-letter substitution).
  - ▶ Caesar (rotation) ciphers (25 possible keys).
  - ▶ Shuffle ciphers (26! possible keys).
- Cipher techniques:
  - ▶ Transposition.
  - ▶ Substitution.
  - ▶ Stream translation.
  - ▶ Block translation.

# Cryptanalysis

- **Cryptanalysis** is the process of discovering how to decrypt ciphertext without the secret key.
  - ▶ Uses **mathematics** and **statistics**.
- Approaches:
  - ▶ Brute force: try all possible keys.
  - ▶ Exploit known plaintext.
  - ▶ Exploit chosen plaintext.
  - ▶ Analyze encryption and decryption algorithms.
  - ▶ Exploit weaknesses in implementations (so-called **side channel attacks**).
- Criteria for measuring the effectiveness of a cipher:
  - ▶ Cost of breaking the cipher vs.  
Value of the encrypted information.
  - ▶ Time required to break the cipher vs.  
Useful lifetime of the encrypted information.

# Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- For many years the most widely used conventional encryption algorithm.
  - ▶ Developed by IBM in the late 1960s.
  - ▶ Adopted by the USA **National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)** in 1977.
- Process:
  - ▶ Same algorithm used for encryption and decryption.
  - ▶ Encryption is performed in 64-bit blocks.
  - ▶ Change of single input bit changes almost all output bits.
  - ▶ Key is 56 bits long (as requested by USA **National Security Agency (NSA)**).
- Security concerns:
  - ▶ Key length (brute force attacks can now work in less than 24 hours),
  - ▶ Internal algorithm structure (design analysis is classified).

# Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- Competitively selected replacement for DES.
  - ▶ Developed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen.
  - ▶ Adopted by the USA NIST in 2001.
  - ▶ Expected to be used worldwide.
- Process:
  - ▶ Same algorithm used for encryption and decryption.
  - ▶ Encryption is performed in 128-bit blocks.
  - ▶ Key is 128, 192, or 256 bits long.
  - ▶ AES algorithm is much faster than DES algorithm.
- Security issues:
  - ▶ AES was approved in 2003 by the USA NSA for **Top Secret** information when used with 192- or 256-bit keys.
  - ▶ As of 2006, the only successful attacks have been **side channel attacks** based on weaknesses in particular implementations of AES.
  - ▶ The algorithm is unclassified, publicly disclosed, and royalty-free.

# International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)

- Developed by Xuejia Lai and James Massey of **Swiss Federal Institute of Technology** and published in 1990.
  - ▶ Patented by Ascom-Tech AG.
  - ▶ No license fee required for noncommercial use.
- Process:
  - ▶ Same algorithm used for encryption and decryption.
  - ▶ 128-bit key is used to encrypt data in 64-bit blocks.
- Major alternative to DES before AES.
  - ▶ Faster than DES.
  - ▶ Considered much more secure than DES.
  - ▶ Included in the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) package.

# Blowfish

- Developed by Bruce Schneier around 1993.
  - ▶ Available without fee for all uses.
  - ▶ Intended as a general-purpose, public-domain replacement for DES.
- Fast, compact, easy to implement.
- Encrypts data in 64-bit blocks.
- Key length may be chosen between 32 and 448 bits.
  - ▶ Higher speed and higher security can be traded off.
- Considered to be an extremely strong algorithm.

# Key Distribution Centers

- Main challenge for conventional encryption: Secret key distribution!
  - ▶ Often too many secret keys are needed to deliver them all physically.
- A key distribution center (KDC) holds a unique master key for each end system.
- Communication between end systems is encrypted using a temporary key called a session key.
  - ▶ One end system  $A$  requests a session key from KDC to communicate with another end system  $B$ .
  - ▶ The KDC sends  $A$  back a message encrypted with  $A$ 's master key containing the session key and a message for  $B$  encrypted with  $B$ 's master key.
  - ▶ The latter message, which contains the session key and  $A$ 's identity, is sent to  $B$  by  $A$ .
- The whole system fails if the KDC is compromised.

# Hashing

- Given an object as input, a **hash function** returns an identification code (called a **hash code**) for the object.
- A hash function has the following properties:
  - ▶ The output has a fixed size, much smaller than the size of the input.
  - ▶ The function is many-to-one (so **collisions** are possible).
  - ▶ The function is deterministic and easy to compute.
- Hash functions are used to:
  - ▶ Build rapidly accessible data storage structures called **hash tables**.
  - ▶ Produce **checksums** for checking data integrity.

# Cryptographic Hashing

- A **cryptographic hash function** is a hash function whose purpose is to produce a “fingerprint” (called a **message digest**, **cryptographic hash code**, or **cryptographic checksum**) of an input object.
- A cryptographic hash function  $h$  has the following properties:
  - ▶ **One-way property**: Given a hash code  $c$ , it is mathematically infeasible to find an object  $x$  such that  $h(x) = c$ .
  - ▶ **Weak collision property**: Given an object  $x$ , it is mathematically infeasible to find another object  $y$  such that  $h(x) = h(y)$ .
  - ▶ **Strong collision property**: It is mathematically infeasible to find two objects  $x$  and  $y$  such that  $h(x) = h(y)$ .
- A **keyed** cryptographic hash function requires a cryptographic key when it is applied.

# One-Way Encryption

- A **one-way encryption function** maps a plaintext to a ciphertext in such a way that it is mathematically infeasible to obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext.
  - ▶ No key is needed.
- **Application:** Password authentication.
  - ▶ When a password is declared, it is mapped by a one-way encryption function to ciphertext that is then stored on the system.
  - ▶ The plaintext is never stored.
  - ▶ A plaintext that is claimed to be a password is verified by comparing the ciphertext it produces with the ciphertext stored on the system.

# Public Key Encryption

- Discovery:
  - ▶ Discovered but held secret by USA NSA and UK Communications-Electronic Security Group in mid to late 1960s.
  - ▶ Discovered and publicized by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman at Stanford University in 1976.
- Motivation:
  - ▶ Difficulty of secret key distribution: secrecy must be shared.
  - ▶ Need for digital signatures that can be verified by arbitrary parties.

# Public Key Encryption: Basic Process

- Each end system has two keys:
  - ▶ Private key that is kept secret.
  - ▶ Public key that is made public.
- Encryption: plaintext, public key  $\xrightarrow{f}$  ciphertext.
- Decryption: ciphertext, private key  $\xrightarrow{f}$  plaintext.
- Signature writing: plaintext, private key  $\xrightarrow{f}$  ciphertext.
- Signature reading: ciphertext, public key  $\xrightarrow{f}$  plaintext.
- The same algorithm is used for both encryption and decryption.
- It is mathematically infeasible to derive the private key from the public key.

# Public Key Encryption Applications (1)

## 1. Confidentiality.

- ▶ The sender encrypts the plaintext message with the receiver's public key.
- ▶ The receiver decrypts the ciphertext message with its private key.

## 2. Integrity, digital signature, and nonrepudiation.

- ▶ The sender encrypts the message digest of the sent text with its private key.
- ▶ The receiver decrypts the encrypted message digest with the sender's public key and compares it with the message digest of the received text.

# Public Key Encryption Applications (2)

## 3. Confidentiality and integrity.

- ▶ The sender encrypts the plaintext message with its private key.
- ▶ The sender encrypts the ciphertext message with the receiver's public key.
- ▶ The receiver decrypts the ciphertext message with its private key.
- ▶ The receiver decrypts the ciphertext message with the sender's public key.

## 4. Secret key exchange.

# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Algorithm

- Appeared in original 1976 Diffie-Hellman paper.
- Used only for secret key exchange.

# RSA Algorithm

- Developed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman at MIT in 1977.
- Supports confidentiality, digital signature, and secret key exchange.
- Most widely used public key algorithm.
- The keys are generated from two large prime numbers  $p$  and  $q$ .
  - ▶  $p$  and  $q$  are private.
  - ▶ The product of  $p$  and  $q$  is public.
  - ▶ **Underlying assumption:** Factoring sufficiently large integers is assumed to be mathematically infeasible.
- RSA is believed to be secure if the keys are sufficiently long.
  - ▶ RSA keys are usually 1024–2048 bits long.

# Key Management

- **Key management** is the part of cryptography concerned with the distribution of cryptographic keys.
- Key management is critical to the effective application of cryptographic methods. Due to its human component, it is perhaps the most challenging aspect of cryptography.
- Services provided by key management systems:
  - ▶ Key generation.
  - ▶ Subject identity and authentication.
  - ▶ Subject to key binding.
  - ▶ Key distribution.
  - ▶ Key revocation.

# Session Keys

- A **session key** is a conventional encryption key that is used for a single communication session.
- Sessions key are discarded after the communication session ends.
- The use of session keys helps prevent:
  1. **Attacks on the cipher** by reducing the amount data that is encrypted and the time the key is in use.
  2. **Replay attacks** because the key is used only once.
  3. **Forward searches** because the key is used only once.
- Session key distribution is nontrivial because a session key must be distributed as secret data to the two different subjects who may not know each other.

# Classical Session Key Exchange

- The basic classical protocol for Alice to request a session key from Cathy to communicate with Bob:
  1. Alice  $\rightarrow$  Cathy :  $\{\text{want session key for Bob}\} k_{\text{Alice,Cathy}}$
  2. Cathy  $\rightarrow$  Alice :  $\{k_{\text{session}}\} k_{\text{Alice,Cathy}} \parallel \{k_{\text{session}}\} k_{\text{Bob,Cathy}}$
  3. Alice  $\rightarrow$  Bob :  $\{k_{\text{session}}\} k_{\text{Bob,Cathy}}$
- **Main assumption:** Alice and Bob both trust Cathy.
- **Problem:** Bob does not know who is sending him messages encrypted with the session key.
  - ▶ This opens Bob up to replay attacks.
  - ▶ Bob needs a way to **authenticate** Alice.

# Needham-Schroeder Protocol

- The **Needham-Schroeder protocol** for Alice to request a session key from Cathy to communicate with Bob:
  1. Alice  $\rightarrow$  Cathy :  $\{ \text{Alice} \parallel \text{Bob} \parallel \text{random } n_1 \} k_{\text{Alice}, \text{Cathy}}$
  2. Cathy  $\rightarrow$  Alice :  $\{ \text{Alice} \parallel \text{Bob} \parallel n_1 \parallel k_{\text{session}} \parallel \{ \text{Alice} \parallel k_{\text{session}} \} k_{\text{Bob}, \text{Cathy}} \} k_{\text{Alice}, \text{Cathy}}$
  3. Alice  $\rightarrow$  Bob :  $\{ \text{Alice} \parallel k_{\text{session}} \} k_{\text{Bob}, \text{Cathy}}$
  4. Bob  $\rightarrow$  Alice :  $\{ \text{random } n_2 \} k_{\text{session}}$
  5. Alice  $\rightarrow$  Bob :  $\{ f(n_2) \} k_{\text{session}}$
- **Main assumption:** Alice and Bob both trust Cathy.
- **Problem:** The session key, which is usually pseudorandomly generated, might be predicted.
  - ▶ Can be solved with the use of timestamps, but this requires clock synchronization.
  - ▶ Can also be solved with the use of a pseudorandomly generated session number.

# Public Key Session Key Exchange

- Public key protocol for Alice to send Bob a session key for communication with him:
  1. Alice  $\rightarrow$  Bob :  $\{k_{\text{session}}\}_{e_{\text{Bob}}}$   
where  $e_{\text{Bob}}$  is Bob's public key.
- **Problem:** Bob does not know who is sending him messages encrypted with his key.
- Better protocol:
  1. Alice  $\rightarrow$  Bob :  $\{\text{Alice} \parallel \{k_{\text{session}}\}_{d_{\text{Alice}}}\}_{e_{\text{Bob}}}$   
where  $d_{\text{Alice}}$  is Alice's private key.
- A **man-in-the-middle** attack can work against this protocol.
- Need a way of binding **identity** to a **public key**.

# Certificates

- A **certificate** is a message that binds an identity to a cryptographic key (usually a public key).
- A certificate issued by Cathy that binds Alice to her public key has the form

$$\{e_{\text{Alice}} \parallel \text{Alice} \parallel T\}d_{\text{Cathy}}.$$

- A **certificate authority (CA)** is an entity that issues certificates.
- $X\langle\langle Y\rangle\rangle$  represent a certificate that the CA  $X$  issued for  $Y$ .

# Certificates Signature Chains

- Certificates are used to validate the issuers of other certificates.
- A **certification signature chain** is a list of certificates of the form

$$X_1 \langle \langle X_2 \rangle \rangle X_2 \langle \langle X_3 \rangle \rangle \cdots X_{n-1} \langle \langle X_n \rangle \rangle.$$

- Two approaches for validating certificates:
  1. **X.509v3 (Directory Authentication Framework).**
  2. **OpenPGP.**
- Certificate signature chains are more flexible in OpenPGP than in X.509v3:
  - ▶ A key may have several signatures.
  - ▶ Signatures may have different levels of trust.
  - ▶ A Version 4 key is signed by its owner.

# Key Storage

- The storage of cryptographic keys is problematic.
- The integrity of public keys must be protected, while both the integrity and the confidentiality of secret and private keys must be protected.
- Keys cannot be safely stored on multi-user computer systems, even as an encrypted file.
  - ▶ The key used to encrypt the file will reside in memory at some time.
  - ▶ Keystrokes can be captured.
- Keys need to be stored on a special dedicated device such as a smart card.

# Key Revocation

- A **key revocation** makes a key invalid before it is set to expire.
- Key revocation requires:
  1. Authorization to issue the revocation.
  2. Timeliness in the communication of the revocation.
- A **certificate revocation list** is a list of certificates that are no longer valid.
  - ▶ Under X.509v3, the list is signed by the issuer of the certificates.
  - ▶ Under OpenPGP, the list is signed by the issuer or owner of the certificates.

# Summary

- There are two principal kinds of encryption:
  1. Conventional encryption used for confidentiality.
  2. Public key encryption used for integrity, digital signature, and nonrepudiation.
- Key management is perhaps the most challenging aspect of cryptography.
  - ▶ Secure session key distribution is difficult.
  - ▶ Binding identity to public keys is problematic.
  - ▶ It is tricky to devise fully secure communication protocols.